Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 4

Article 2

5-1-1947

Application of the First Amendment to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
Mary Barbara McCarthy

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mary B. McCarthy, Application of the First Amendment to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, 22 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 400 (1947).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol22/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

THE APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
TO THE STATES BY THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION
Under the Constitution of the United States a dual form
of government exists, namely, a federal government and
state governments. This principle of duality is found in
the fact that the government of the United States is one
of enumerated and implied powers; the state governments,
those of reserved powers.
Significant enumerated powers
of the federal government are expressed in Article I, Section
8, and in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. The
Tenth Amendment gives testimony that subsidiary powers
are reserved to the states: The "powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people." Certain sovereign powers are delegated to the
United States that are prohibited to the states, such as the
power to coin money or to make treaties: Article I, Section 10, Clause 1.
When the Constitution was sent to the states for ratification, in 1787, there was criticism because the Constitutional Convention that framed the document had not incorporated into it a bill of rights. Fear was expressed in
the states that without specific guarantees, written into the
law, civil rights and liberties of the people might be jeopardized by a federal government, possessing a vast array of
powers which the Constitution delegated to it. The Constitution was ratified by the people through state constitutional ratifying conventions, but with the assurance that
a bill of rights would immediately be incorporated into it,
restraining the federal government in behalf of individual
liberty. Pressing for a bill of rights, statesmen at the time
evidently thought of such constitutional provision only in
terms of its becoming a restraint on the federal government.
Between the lines of his argument against a bill of rights,
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Hamilton testified to this, for he impliedly said that to prohibit the federal government from doing things outside the
scope of its delegated authority would not only be unneces-

sary but unwise; adding, "the Constitution itself, if adopted,
will be a bill of rights for the Union." 1
The first ten Amendments to the Constitution were
adopted by the necessary number of states ratifying the
Constitution 2 in the interim, 1788-1789. This Bill of Rights
of the Constitution was declared in force December 15,
1791. The First Amendment declares that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press; or the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." It is clear that the prohibitions of the First
Amendment are on Congress, the lawmaking body of the
federal government, and that the First Amendment is not
applicable to the states as a restraint on them; it is deducible that not any of the amendments of the federal Bill
of Rights, couched in terms of general prohibitions, blanket
the states.' In the first quarter of the nineteenth century,
1 Hamilton: Tan

FEDERALTsr, LXXXIV
2 U. S. CONST. ART. VII. The ratification of the conventions of nine states
shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution beween the states so
ratifying the same.
3 Generally, in their respective bills of rights, state constitutions restrained
their governments. Although between the late eighteenth and the middle nineteenth centuries a few states restrained the free exercise of religion and discriminated against particular religious groups, on the other hand, many states constitutionally provided for religious freedom. Under the first organizations of state
governments in view of early state constitutions, the elector was generally a
freeholder subject to religious qualifications. But in the struggle for the extension
of the franchise which began with the westward movements of populations and
the spread of Jeffersonian democracy, religious qualifications for electors began to
disappear from state constitutions. In the early nineteenth century, new state
constitutions began to provide that no religious tests should -be required as a
qualification for voting or for holding public office under the state; or the civil
rights and privileges of state citizens be affected by their religious principles. Cf.
state constitutions of Indiana, 1816, Art. I, Sec. 3; Illinois, 1818, Art. VIII, Sec.
4; Alabama, 1819, Art I, Sec. 7; Maine, 1820, Art. I, Sec. 5; Michigan, 1837, Art.
II, Sec. 3; Texas, 1845, Art. I, Sec. 3; Minnesota, 1857, Art. I, Sec. 17; Oregon,
1857, Art. I, Sec. 4; Nebraska, 1866, Art. I, Sec. 18; Louisiana, 1868, Art. 12;
Mississippi, 1868, Art. I, Sec. 18.
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however, the notion was advanced that civil liberty guarantees of the Bill of Rights ought to be construed as restraints
on state governments as well as on the federal government.
This was the contention of the plaintiff in the case of Barron
v. Baltimore, decided in 1833. 4 In paving its streets the city
of Baltimore had diverted certain streams, causing them to
deposit sand and gravel near the wharf of a certain Barron,
making the water around his wharf too shallow for the approach of vessels. Barron's wharf had formerly been surrounded by the deepest water in the harbor, but now it
was useless to him. The state court reversed a verdict of
$4,500 for Barron and a writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. It was alleged by Barron
that the city of Baltimore violated the eminent domain
clause of the Fifth Amendment, which declares that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.5 In delivering the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall felt compelled to declare that the Court had no jurisdiction in the case. In substance, it was held that the Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the
United States for themselves; this was declared in the Preamble. It was not established for the government of the
states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and
in it provided such limitations on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated. The people of
the United States framed such a government for the United
States as seemed best adapted to promote their interests.
The powers they conferred on this government were to be
exercised by itself; and the limitations on its power, if ex4

7 PETERs 243, 8 L. Ed. 672.

5 Had the Fourteenth Amendment been operative then as now, Barron would
have had redress under its due process clause. Chief Justice Marshall holding
there was no redress in the Supreme Court of the United States, Barron was without compensation for his loss of property. His cause, however, was long remembered and reverted to in 1866 when, after the Civil War, the congressional
Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction was drafting the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because of the times, it appeared that the Amendment was adopted solely to
secure the rights of freedmen hampered by the South. When the Amendment was
proposed the intention was that. But there were two groups on the Committee
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pressed in general terms are naturally and necessarily applicable to the government created by that instrument. If
in the ninth and tenth sections of Article I of the original
Constitution, a plain line is drawn of discrimination between
the limitations it imposes on the powers of the federal
government and on those of the states, if in every inhibition intended to act on state power, words are used that
directly express the intent, then strong reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course in
framing the Amendments before that departure can be assumed. The Chief Justice went on to say that he searched
in vain for the reason; that the Bill of Rights adopted by the

states contain no expression that would indicate an intention
to apply them to .the states.
More than a century after this pronouncement by Chief
Justice Marshall, the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in
1868, was construed to make the First Amendment applicable to the states. In the case of Cantwell v. Connectidrafting it, one bent on establishing, under the federal constitution, the rights of
the recently freed Negro against state legislation; the other group determined to
include the property and other rights of persons in the whole range of the country's
economy, for at that time the industrial revolution had given rise to great corporations for profit, and railroad corporations were suffering from discriminating
state taxes. Eminent corporation lawyers in the persons of John Brigham and
Roscoe Conkling belonged to the latter group. Brigham succeeded in incorporating the due process clause into the draft. He used the words of the Fifth Amendment qualified by "nor shall any state." When the original Constitution was
drafted, Negro slaves were referred to in it, as "persons" (Art. I, Sec. 2 Cl. 3;
Sec. 9, Cl. 1; Art. IV,Sec. 2, Cl. 3). Thus when the Fourteenth Amendment used
person in the due process clause, it was taken to mean just the freedman: Cf.
Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394. Using the word "person"
Brigham had another meaning. He recalled Barron's plight in 1833, and had always thought that it was shortsightedness in the framers to have made no provision in the law for the protection of the individual against the states. He
therefore designed the "cabalistic" clause and got it into the Constitution, so that
"the poorest man in -his hovel as well as the prince in his palace may have
security in his property" against the states. In 1882, arguing a tax case, Roscoe
Conkling laid before the Supreme Court the unpublished journal of the Committee
of Fifteen with the intentions of Brigham in the record. In view of this, Conkling
argued that the due process clause protected any person, therefore a corporation.
The Court thereafter began to adhere to the doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes judicially enforceable restriotions on state social legislation: Cf. San
Mateo County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 116 U. S. 136 (1886).
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cut,6 decided in 1940, the Court held that the fundamental
concept of "liberty," embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment, which declires that Congress shall enact no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The Court went on to state that the Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states
as incompetent as Congress to enact laws which will deprive
individuals of their liberty without due process of law; that
although the right to free exercise of a chosen form of religion is not absolute because conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society, yet the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in obtaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe protected freedom; nor
may a state by statute wholly deny the right to preach or
to disseminate religious views. Because the Connecticut
statute involved in this case prohibited solicitations of money
for religious, charitable, or philanthrophic causes without approval of the secretary of public welfare, and authorized the
6 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). Newton Cantwell and
two sons, Jesse and Russell, members of Jehovah's Witnesses, and claiming to be
ordained ministers, were arrested in New Haven, Connecticut. Each ws charged
by information in five counts, with statutory and common law offenses. After
trial in the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, each of them was
convicted on the third count, which charged a violation of a section of the general
statutes of Connecticut, and on the fifth count, charging commission of the common law offense of inciting a breach of the peace. On appeal to the Supreme
Court the conviction of all three .was affirmed. The conviction of Jesse Cantwell was affirmed on the fifth count, but the conviction of Newton and Russell
on that count was reversed and a new trial ordered as to them. By demurrers to
the information, by requests for rulings of law at the trial, and by their assignments of error in the state Supreme Court, the appellants pressed the contention
that the statute under which the third count was drawn was offensive to the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, on its face as it was construed and applied, it denied them freedom of speech and prohibited their free
exercise of religion. In like manner they made the point that they could not ba
found guilty on the fifth count, without violation of the Amendment. The Supreme Court declared it had jurisdiction on appeal from the judgments on the
third count, as there was drawn in question the validity of a state statute under
the Federal Constitution, and the decision was in favor of the validity. Since the
conviction on the fifth count was not based upon a statute, but presented a substantial question under the Federal Constitution, the Court granted the writ of
certiorari in respect of it. The judgment affirming the convictions on the third
and fifth count was reversed, and the cause was remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
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secretary, upon application of any person in behalf of such
cause, to determine if such cause is a religious one or a bomz
fide object of charity, of philanthropy, the Court held that
the law violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the extent that it authorized a censorship of religion by the
secretary through power conferred on him to withhold his
approval.
Subsequent to the Cantwell case, other cases came before
the Court in which state legislation was challenged in view
of "liberty" in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as blanketed by the First Amendment. In
Largent v. Texas,7 decided in 1943, a city ordinance was held
unconstitutional as abridging freedom of religion, of speech,
and of the press. In this case the ordinance required a permit to solicit for or to sell books within the residential part
of the city, and it authorized the mayor to issue a permit
after a thorough investigation.8 The ordinance was held unconstitutional as applied to the distribution of religious publications by a member of a religious sect. In Jamison v.
Texas,9 decided in 1943, the Court ruled that the right to distribute on the streets handbills concerning religious subjects
7 318 U. S. 418, 63 S. Ct. 667, 87 L. Ed. 873.
8 A Mrs. Largent was charged with violating a city ordinance making it unlawful for any person to solicit orders or to sell books, 'wares, or merchandise
within the residential portion of the city without a permit. The appellant's "evidence showed she carried a card of ordination from the Watch Tower Bible and
Tract Society, that organization a part of Jehovah's Witnesses. The Witnesses,
founded upon and drawing from the tenets of Christianity, is an evangelical group.
Mrs. Largent was convicted for violating this ordinance, and she appealed to the
county court of Lamar county, where a trial de novo was had, in view of a
Texas statute. There a motion was filed to quash the complaint because the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and at the conclusion of the evidence
a motion rwas filed on the same grounds for a finding of not guilty and the discharge of the appellant from custody. Both were overruled. Appeal was brought
into the Supreme Court.
9 This was another Texas case in which the appellant, a member of the
Jehovah's Witnesses, was charged with distributing handbills on the streets of
Dallas, Texas, in violation of an ordinance that prohibited their distribution:
318 U. S. 413, 63 S. Ct. 699, 87 L. Ed. 869.
For elaborate arguments on the First Amendment, prior to its later application
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Cf. Terrett v. Taylor, 1914, 9 Cranch.
43, 3 L. Ed. 650; Watson v. Jones, 1872, 13 Wall. 670, 20 L. Ed. 666. See also,
Reynolds v. United States, 1878, 98 U. S. 182, 25 L. Ed. 244.
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may not be prohibited at all times, at all places, and under
all circumstances. The Court held an ordinance prohibiting
the dissemination of information on the streets by handbills,
unconstitutional, as applied to handbills inviting the public
to meetings of a religious sect, at which no admission fee
was charged. The ordinance was held to deny freedom of
religion and the press, rights protected by the First Amendment.
In the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania,"° decided in 1943,
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First
Amendment applicable to the states, the Court rendered the
opinion that the spreading of one's religious beliefs through
the distribution of religious literature or preaching the Gospel is an age-old type of evangelism that is given protection
under constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, of the
press, and of religion. A license tax for such solicitation
drew from the Court this deduction: The fact that the ordinance requiring this license tax is nondiscriminatory is immaterial. The protection afforded by the First Amendment
is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire
constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike.
Such equality of treatment does not save the ordinance.
The freedom of press, speech, and religion are in a preferred
position. It could hardly be denied, the Court said, that a
tax laid specifically on the exercise of those freedoms would
be unconstitutional. Yet the license tax imposed is in substance just that. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette," decided in 1943, the Court held that the
10 319 U. S. 105, 63 S. Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943). Petitioners in this
case were also Jehovah's Witnesses, who went from door to door soliciting people
to purchase certain religious books. This was held in violation of a city ordinance
that required the solicitor to pay a license tax.
11 319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943). This suit was
brought by Walter Barnette and others against the West Virginia State Board of
Education and others, for an injunction to restrain enforcement of an order requiring children in public schools to salute the American flag. From a decree
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Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the states, protects
the citizen against the state itself and all its creatures including boards of education. Holding invalid the challenged
resolution, the Court declared that it denied freedom of
speech and worship; that it transcended the constitutional
limitations placed on the board's power, and invaded the
sphere of the spirit and the intellect, which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to reserve from all official control.
Referring to the First Amendment as applied to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court expressed the
opinion that the test of legislation colliding with the First
Amendment is much more definite than the test when only
the Fourteenth Amendment is involved; that much of the
vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the
specific prohibitions of the First Amendment become its
standard.
granting an injunction the defendants appealed. The Board had adopted, in
1942, in view of a state statute, a resolution that contained recitals largely from the
Court's opinion in the Gobitis case, 310 U. S. 586, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375
(1940). The resolution ordered the salute to the flag to become a regular part
of the program of activities in the public schools. All teachers and pupils were
required to participate in the salute. Refusal so to salute was to be regarded as
an act of insubordination, to be dealt with accordingly. The salute that was originally required brought protests from various groups including the Red Cross,
Parent and Teacher Associations, and the Boy and Girl Scouts, and some modification was made in deference to these objections. But no concession was made
to Jehovah's Witnesses. Failure to conform being considered insubordination, the
penalty was expulsion from school. The expelled child being held unlawfully
absent, he could be proceeded against as a delinquent. The appellees, citizens of
the United States, brought suit in the United States District Court, asking its injunction to restrain enforcement of those laws against Jehovah's Witnesses. The
Witnesses are an unincorporated body, teaching that the obligation that is imposed by the law of God is superior to man-made laws for temporal governments.
They adhere to the literal version of Exodus, XX 4, 5, and consider the flag as
an "image" ,within this divine command. For that reason they refuse to salute it.
The Board of Education moved to dismiss the complaint of parents of children
who were threatened with prosecution for causing delinquency, the plaintiffs
alleging that the laws and regulations were an unconstitutional denial of religious
freedom secured by the First Amendment, and a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment due process of law and equal protection of law clauses. The District
Court restrained the enforcement as to the plaintiffs and those of that class. The
Board of Education brought the case to the Supreme Court by direct appeal: 28
U. S. C. Sec. 380 U. S. C. A.
See also Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573, 64 S. Ct., 717, 88 L. Ed.
938 (1944). Marsh v. Alabama, 327 U. S. 573, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946).
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In 1947, the Court looked back over less than a decade,
to rulings in which the Fourteenth Amendment had been
construed to make the prohibitions of the First Amendment
applicable to state action abridging religion. 2 The Court
stated that since that tribunal had accepted the broad meaning given the First Amendment in those cases decided by the
light of the freedom of religion clause, there was every reason to give the same broad application and construction to
the establishment of religion clause of the same Amendment.'" This was stated in Everson v. Board of Education
of Ewing Township,' 4 decided February 10, 1947. This
12 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213
(1940); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 63 S. Ct. 669, 87 L. Ed. 869 (1943);
Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418, 63 S. Ct. 667, 87 L. Ed. 873 (1943); Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 63 S. Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943); W. Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed.
1628 (1943); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573, 64 S. Ct. 717, 88 L.
Ed. 938 (1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 327 U. S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276 (1946).
18 "It is in the repetition of this unjustifiable blanketing of the first ten
amendments into the fourteenth that in my opinion the Court made its chief
error in the Bus case," states Dr. Clarence Manion. "Ten years ago this case would
have been tossed out of the Supreme Court for lack of jurisdiction for the reason
that -whether or not New Jersey wished to establish a religion outright and by
law was a matter exclusively within the province of the State of New Jersey as
limited by the Bill of Rights in the New Jersey State Constitution. This explains
what you read some years ago that 'the Federal Constitution prevents Congress
from enacting laws that would be helpful or prejudicial to any particular religious
denomination, but does not prevent the State Legislature from enacting such
laws."'
14 67 S. Ct. 510. This was an appeal from the Court of Errors and Appeals
of the State of New Jersey. Certiorari proceedings by Arch R. Everson to set
aside a resolution of the Ewing Township board of education were advanced.
This resolution, challenged, provided for transportation of pupils in public and
parochial schools. A New Jersey statute authorized its school districts to make
rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from school. The
appellee, a township board of education, in acting pursuant to this statute, authorized reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for bus transportation of their children on the regular buses operated by the public transportation system. Part of this money was for payment of transportation of some
children in the community to Catholic parochial schools, which give their students
both secular and religious instruction; the religious teaching conforming to the
tenets and modes of worship of the Catholic Faith. The superintendent of these
schools is a Catholic priest. In his capacity as a district taxpayer, the appellant
filed suit in a state court, challenging the right of the Board to reimburse parents
of parochial school students. He contended that both the statute and the resolution in question violated both the state and the federal constitutions. A judgment setting aside the resolution (132 N. J. L. 98, ....A. 2d 75) was reversed by
the State Court of Errors and Appeals (133 N. J. L. 350, 44 A. 2d 333), and the
petitioner appealed [28 U. S. C. A. Sec. 344 (a), 28 U. S. C. Sec. 34 (a)], bringing
up the suit into the Supreme Court of the United States.
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case involved the free bus transportation issue, a taxpayer of New Jersey contending that a New Jersey law
amounted to a contribution of public funds in support of a
religious establishment. 5 This suit gave rise to the old
question of separation of Church and State.
Declaring the New Jersey law constitutional, the Court
stated that striking down a state law is not a matter of such
light moment that it should be done by a federal court ex
mero motu on a postulate neither charged nor proved, but
which rests on nothing but a possibility; that the authority
of the Supreme Court to strike down statutes on the ground
that the purpose for which the tax-raised funds were to be
expended was not a public one, must be exercised with
great caution; that the fact that a state law, passed to satisfy
a public need coincides with the personal desire of the in15 In the Eversmon case, the Court reviewed briefly the history of State and
Church in the English colonies of North America: "The very charters granted by
the English Crown to individuals and companies . . . authorized these to erect
religious establishments, which all, 'whether believers or non-believers, would be
required to support and attend. An exercise of this authority was accompanied
by . . .persecutions. Catholics found themselves hounded and prosecuted because
of their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were
peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestants ... And all these dissenters
were compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored churches
whose -ministers preached inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen and consolidate the established faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters ..
In recent years, so far as the provision against the establishment of a religion
is concerned, the question has most frequently arisen in connection with proposed
state aid to church schools and efforts to carry on religious teachings in the public
schools in accordance -with the tenets of a particular sect. Some church schools
have either sought or accepted state financial aid for their schools. Here again
the efforts to obtain state aid or acceptance of it have not been limited by any
particular faith. The state courts, in the main, have remained faithful to the
language of their own constitutional provisions designed to protect religious freedom and to separate religions and governments. Their decisions, however, show
all the difficulty in drawing the line between tax legislation which provides funds
for the welfare of the general public and that which is designed to support institutions which teach religion .... )
Denial of free bus transportation to children attending private schools appears
to be based on the contention that the use of public money for such purposes
would tend to endanger the so-called traditional American theory .and practice of
separation of Church and State. Then again it is asserted, that such transportation violates many of the state constitutions, -which prohibit the giving of aid to
any religious sect or denomination. Although the greater number of the states
deny by constitutional provision such aid, a number of these allow such transportation to pupils of private schools even though their laws deny such aid.
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dividuals most directly affected, is an inadequate reason for
the Supreme Court to say that a legislature has erroneously
appraised the public need. Nor does it follow that a law
has a private rather than a public purpose because it provides that tax-raised funds will be paid to reimburse individuals on account of money spent in a way which furthers
a public program.
Tending toward the pronouncement of decision in the
Everson case the Court said: 16
16 This reasoning of the Court approaches the true concept of the separation
of Church and State. This true concept is consummately set forth by John Courtney, S. J., in A~mcA, February 15, 1947:
"... Before one can know whether public aid to parochial schools is the entering wedge in the wall of separation of Church and State, one must know where
this wall is and what it walls off from 'what . .. There is a constitutional 'wall'
between state authority and the religious conscience. There is also a wall between
state authority and the parental conscience; it was constitutionally affirmed in
the famous Oregon School case, in which the Court denied to the state the right
to force parents to send their children to public schools. In general, there is a
wall between the areas ruled respectively (and exclusively) by civil authority
and religious authority. But the metaphor must not be pressed too far. The
Supreme Court of Mississippi (in Chance v. Mississippi . . . ) well said: 'Useful
citizenship is a product and servant of both Church and State, and the citizen's
freedom must include the right to acknowledge the rights and benefits of each
. . . Indeed, the State has made historical acknowledgment and daily legislative
admission of a mutual dependence, one upon the other. It is the control of one
over the other that our Constitution forbids.'
"Good citizenship and general welfare are complex but undivided entities; to
them both Church and State, remaining 'separate,' make their respective contributions, each freely admitting and encouraging the contribution of the other. Whatever deformations may have been introduced into individual minds by secularist
or religious prejudice, this is historically and constitutionally the genuine spirit of
the American principle of separation of Church and State. What canons of interpretation have we? I suggest three. First, the principle of separation of Church
and State seeks to insure the general welfare . . . and to guarantee to Church
and State - and parents under the guidance of religious conviction - full freedom for the discharge of their respective responsibilities. Consequently, this principle may not be so applied in the field of education as to result in damage to the
general welfare, or in the unreasonable limitation of either state sovereignty or
religious and parental rights. Secondly, the general welfare of the United States
has as an essential component the maintenance of the free American system of education. By this I mean the coexistence and free functioning of two types of schools
the non-profit, tax-exempt, church-related school ... and the public school . ..
Thirdly, one must take seriously the doctrine of the State as parens patriae, i.e.,
as the supreme sovereignty whose power must always be exercised with particular
tenderness towards those of its citizens who are under disability, especially the
disability of childhood, helplessness ... Moreover, one must realize that the State
is primarily 'parent' of children, not of schools . . . Certainly from the stand-,
point of the Federal Constitution, the American state is not interested in whether
a child attends a public or a parochial school . . . But the American State is In-
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"New Jersey cannot consistently with the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment contribute funds to the support of an institution which
teaches the tenets and faith of any church. On the other
hand, other language of the Amendment commands
that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion. Consequently it cannot
exclude individual members of any other faith, because
of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits
of public welfare legislation. While we do not mean to
intimate that a state could not provide transportation
only to children that are attending public schools, we
must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey
against state-established churches, to be sure that we
do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief... The First Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary. State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions,
than it is to favor them ... The First Amendment has

erected a wall between church and state. That wall
must be kept high and impregnable. We could not
approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not
breached it here."
Sister Mary BarbaraMcCarthy, S.S.J.

terested in its children who are equally its wards and are equally its citizens ...
It must take a strict account of what kind of patria it is 'parent' of; namely, of
a nation of mixed religions and of free two-component educational system. It
must therefore so frame and administer its legislation, based on the parens patriae,
as to see that all its benefits flow equally to all children, regardless of their religion and . . .particular type of education they' want in consequence of their
religion. ....
.

